With regard to the comparison between reciprocal agreements (EPA) and non-reciprocal agreements, these results show that the two models are positive in terms of exports from recipient countries to developed countries and that despite the estimate of the point for reciprocal agreements is greater than for non-reciprocal agreements, the difference between them is not statistically significant. However, with regard to exports from industrialized countries to recipient countries, the impact on non-reciprocal agreements is greater. After the civil war, Democrats were generally in favor of trade liberalization and Republicans in general favored higher tariffs. The model was clearly in the congressional votes on tariffs from 1860 to 1930. Democrats were the minority in Congress in the majority of Congresses between the Civil War and the election of Roosevelt. During their brief terms in the majority, Democrats passed several bills to reduce tariffs. Examples include the Wilson-Gorman Act of 1894 and the Underwood Tariff Act of 1913. However, successive Republican majorities have always reversed unilateral tariff cuts.  As shown above, Table 1 shows standard errors grouped only at the pair level.  examines in a recent paper the consequences of non-compliance with the interdependence of disturbances in several dimensions, with model models for the structural gravity of cross-sectional data and bilateral trade panels, if concluded.
These authors conclude that ignoring multi-channel clusters leads to misleading conclusions about the relevance of preferential trade agreements of different types, since multi-tiered consolidation has a significant impact on standard errors in commercial cost variables. To address this problem, Table 2 presents the results of multi-level grouping that allow for a correlation in the notion of error in all possible cluster dimensions. The grouping clearly has no impact on point estimates. The results show that despite significant differences between the two types of standard errors (grouped standard errors are higher), all estimates of positives at the 1% meaning level remain statistically significant and all previous conclusions remain unchanged. Columns 3 to 5 show the results if we break down, in turn, the decoding of the PTA, the fake GATT or both depending on the group to which each trading partner belongs. Two comments are correct. First, in all cases and regardless of the type of standard errors considered, the results show a positive and statistically significant effect (at least 10%) for models of mutual agreements that will account for the impact on exports when developed countries are the target markets. Second, the statistically significant coefficient for non-reciprocal agreements in columns 3 to 5, when standard defects are linked to country pairs, loses statistical significance when standard defects are grouped repeatedly.
Specification data is unstable. Results for the log-linear version of the gravitational equation with the OLS (including fixed export and importer effects changing time, as well as country time pairs) indicate that reciprocal and non-reciprocal trade agreements have had economic and statistically significant impacts, regardless of the direction of trade flows.